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Abstract:  
 
Poverty indicators often disagree about whether a person is poor or not. Yet, when it comes to 
assessing whether a programme is successful in reaching the poor the dominant practice is to use 
an income poverty indicator. This paper investigates whether the choice of welfare indicator 
influences the pro-poorness assessment of an intervention. Using the official European Union 
income and material deprivation indicators, this paper compares the outcomes of three 
performance indicators for three types of income transfers in six European countries. The 
analysis indicates that income transfers are assessed as far more successful when the information 
from both indicators is combined.   
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SILC 
 
JEL: I32, I38 
 
Acknowledgements: This project was undertaken under affiliation with the Maastricht Graduate 
School of Governance at Maastricht University as part of an EU-SILC approved research project. 
It is also part of the contributions of the international research project Poverty Reduction in 
Europe: Social Policy and Innovation (ImPRovE). I would like to thank the participants to the 
UNU-Merit-MGsoG lunch seminar (University of Maastricht, 1 May 2012) and the CSB-
lunchseminarie (University of Antwerp, 9 May 2012) for their valuable feedback as well as 
assistants Michelle Boks, Julie Charest, Kirsten Davis and Khadidiatou Sy for their 
contributions. 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Assisting the less well-off is often an explicit or implicit aim of public interventions and 
especially in policy domains such as taxation, social protection, social work, health, education 
and housing. Irrespective of whether an intervention is specifically targeted at the least well off 
or at a broader segment of the population, policy analysts need to choose an indicator to evaluate 
the intervention’s success.  
 
When evaluating the pro-poorness or progressiveness of interventions, income is by far the most 
popular indicator to assess whether an intervention i) reaches the poor / is progressive, ii) has an 
impact and iii) is cost-effective. The advantages of income as an indicator of ‘success’ are that 
the information is widely available in administrative and survey data; it typically reflects 
families’ most important source of financing their living standard; and, particularly in large 
samples, its near-continuous distribution allows assessing income differences between groups as 
well as changes over time with considerable precision. 
 
Income, however, is not without shortcomings and it is also not the only available indicator of 
success. Asset holdings, for instance, can also finance a family’s living standard (Brandolini, 
Magri, & Smeeding, 2010). In the case of assets, ignoring such information underestimates a 
family’s financial resources while for debts the reverse holds. Moreover, the value of in-kind 
transfers and indirect taxes is typically not accounted for in assessing a family’s income which 
may also misestimate a family’s resources (Garfinkel, Rainwater, & Smeeding, 2006; Paulus, 
Sutherland, & Tsakloglou, 2010). In all of the above cases the missing information can explain 
why discrepancies between a family’s income and its actual living standard may arise. A further 
shortcoming of income is that the indicator implicitly assumes that the goods and services can be 
purchased from well-functioning markets ignoring market imperfections and market failures 
such as rationing and public goods (Bourguignon & Chakravarty, 2003). Sen (1999) further 
argued that, albeit important, income is merely a means to an end; and, that in addition to the 
above mentioned shortcomings, there are contextual differences between individuals (be they 
personal, environmental, social, cultural or intra-household) that can explain why individuals 
with the same income and desires may end up with different outcomes. 
 
In addition to using better or complementary indicators of financial resources, an alternative 
group of indicators focuses on a family’s material outcomes to assess the success of policy 
interventions: the advantage of such indicators is that they measure a family’s or person’s living 
standard in direct way.1 In Europe, Australia, Canada and developing countries such indicators 
are typically labelled as ‘material deprivation’ (Nelson, 2012; Saunders & Wong, 2011) while in 
the United States the term ‘material hardship’ has more currency (Cancian & Meyer, 2004; 
Huston & Bentley, 2010; Lim, Livermore, & Davis, 2010; Wu & Eamon, 2010; Zilanawala & 
Pilkauskas, 2012). In either case, the indicators are measuring whether the family or person is 
involuntarily missing an item or aspect considered to be normal or typical for the society in 
which they live (Guio, 2009; Townsend, 1979). Examples of such indicators are whether the 
                                                 
1 The advantages and shortcomings of such indicators are further discussed in section 3. 
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family was cut off from basic utilities such as water and electricity, or whether the family can 
afford to have fresh fruit every day.  
 
As the use of non-monetary indicators increased, scholars have investigated the degree to which 
monetary and non-monetary poverty proxies overlap at the level of families and individuals (see 
for instance in Europe: (Fusco, Guio, & Marlier, January 2011; Nolan & Whelan, 2010); and in 
the United States: (Cancian & Meyer, 2004; Sullivan, Turner, & Danziger, 2008). Using 
different definitions of indicators and covering different countries, the common finding among 
such studies is that while there is a positive correlation between monetary and non-monetary 
proxies, they only partially overlap resulting in significantly sized groups being poor according 
to one but not the other and a ‘core’ group being poor according to several indicators. Rather 
than selecting the ‘best’ one, the proxies are generally seen as complementary and in poverty 
analyses it is now common practice to monitor poverty using various proxies. For instance, the 
European Union annually reports on poverty and social exclusion by using a portfolio of 
indicators (Marlier, Atkinson, Cantillon, & Nolan, 2007).  
 
In policy analyses, however, the effect of programmes and policies on poverty is typically 
evaluated using either a monetary or a non-monetary poverty proxy. This is problematic because 
as these indicators only partially identify the same group of individuals as poor or less well off, 
different indicators may assess a programme’s performance differently. This is exactly what 
Cancian and Meyer (2004) find when using an income poverty proxy and material hardship 
indicators to assess the living standard of TANF participants in Wisconsin.  
 
This paper investigates this issue further by focusing on the question: how influential is the 
choice of welfare indicator when assessing the pro-poorness of policy interventions? The 
research takes a cross-national perspective comparing six EU member states and focuses on key 
income transfers to households with working age adults: social assistance, housing allowances 
and family allowances. Included are Germany, France, United Kingdom, Ireland, Netherlands 
and Sweden: these countries have a similar average living standard but have different social 
protection systems. We use two welfare indicators that are used by the EU to construct poverty 
measures: income and material deprivation. Both indicators are measured at the household level; 
the EU material deprivation indicator is the number of deprivation items (nine in total) that a 
household is lacking. Rather than using the official EU poverty and material deprivation 
indicators, which yield different estimates of poor population groups, we analyse pro-poorness 
by looking at the 20 percent of the population based on the pre-transfer income and material 
deprivation distributions. A transfer is considered pro-poor when it reaches the least well off 
and/or when the sum of transfers is distributed progressively.2 The natural variation existing 
between these countries and the design of their income transfers provide ample scope for 
investigating whether using different poverty proxies affects the pro-poorness assessment and 
over what range such assessments can differ. The latter is particularly important not only because 
it informs those involved in impact studies and policy evaluations but also because it provides an 
indication of whether the differences are likely to be large enough to reassess the interventions.  
                                                 
2 The analysis in this paper does not attempt to isolate the effect of the intervention (i.e. income transfers) from other 
factors influencing families’ well-being such as their capabilities, behaviour or other help received. 
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After discussing a number of key considerations relevant for (pro-poorness) assessments, this 
paper explains the methods and data used. This is followed by the presentation of the findings 
and a concluding discussion. 
 
2. Assessing pro-poorness  
 
The problem of evaluating the pro-poorness of an intervention appears simple in theory but is 
less straightforward in practice because the analyst faces a double identification problem: she 
needs to assess whether an individual is poor and whether this person is an intended beneficiary 
of the intervention. If the sole objective of the intervention were to exclusively assist every poor 
individual then, in theory, it is successful when poor individuals participate and non-poor 
individuals do not (see Table 1A). In practise, the analyst has to rely on proxies to make this 
assessment. Even if data quality and misreporting are not an issue, a proxy is only a guess of 
whether this is the ‘right’ individual. Using an income poverty proxy, for example, we may 
identify a millionaire living off his/her assets as poor (false positive) and a modest-income 
family with high-cost needs as non-poor (false negative). Consequently, there is uncertainty 
around the failure / success labels in Table 1A. Using several poverty proxies jointly will not 
solve this fundamental problem either. Unless the proxies completely overlap, the potential target 
population increases (Table 1B).  
   
Table 1A: Evaluating pro-poorness in theory (in practice) 
 Intervention 
Economic well-being Participates Does not participate 
Poor Success (?) Failure (?) 
Not poor Failure (?) Success (?) 
 
Table 1B: Evaluating pro-poorness with multiple proxies (in practice) 
 Intervention 
Economic well-being Participates Does not participate 
Proxy I: poor Success (?) Failure (?) 
Proxy II: poor Success (?) Failure (?) 
Proxy I & II: poor Success (?) Failure (?) 
Proxy I & II: not poor Failure (?) Success (?) 
 
Moreover, most interventions do not aim to exclusively reach every poor individual. Even 
programmes whose primary aim is to assist the poor are often explicitly designed to include the 
‘near poor’. This is to prevent behavioural disincentives resulting in poverty or welfare traps but 
also in acknowledgement of the above mentioned measurement problem. Furthermore, the 
experience of poverty and the escape from it is seen as a gradual process rather than a discrete 
event. There are also programmes serving a broader population, which may not have an explicit 
or exclusive poverty reduction objective, but which nevertheless assist the least well off (such as 
universal health insurance or child benefits). Thus, while assistance to non-poor participants 
represents a failure when strictly applying the pro-poorness criterion, it may still be considered a 
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success when a somewhat broader criterion is applied.3 Therefore it is desirable to also study the 
pro-poorness, or better, progressiveness of an intervention encompassing a larger part of the 
population. Given these reasons, this paper looks at the poorest 20 percent of the population 
rather than the percentage of the population deemed poor according to the official EU income 
poverty and material deprivation indicators.   
Finally, there may be circumstances in which one proxy may be preferred over another. For 
instance, some programmes are designed to address the problems of specific subpopulations of 
the poor (i.e. the chronic poor, the poor elderly or the poor with low levels of human capital) and 
it may well be that one proxy tends to be more successful at identifying this sub-population than 
other proxies.   
3. Data and methods  
 
To investigate how different welfare indicators influence the assessment of the progressiveness 
of policy interventions this study takes a comparative approach involving six European Union 
member states, three categories of income transfers, two welfare indicators and three 
performance indicators. The countries have been selected because they have a similar average 
living standard but different social protection systems and different social and economic 
structures. This natural variation serves as a background against which to explore the degree to 
which pro-poorness assessments may differ when different welfare indicators are used. A 
practical advantage is that for these countries information from a harmonized data source is 
available.    
3.1 Data 
This paper uses microdata from the 2007 cross-sectional component of the European Union 
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). The EU-SILC data (available from 2004 
on) provide comparative annual statistics on income, poverty and social exclusion that are 
collected by the national statistics offices of 32 European countries. A common framework is 
used to collect harmonized variables on private households and individuals.4 The database holds 
a range of individual and household level income information including disposable income and 
income from transfer categories such as pensions, unemployment benefits, disability benefits, 
family and child related allowances, housing allowances and social assistance allowances. The 
database further holds information on a range of material deprivation items as well as 
information on the characteristics of the household and its members (demographics, health, 
labour and education). Although the EU-SILC data are by far the best data around for this type of 
analysis, the cross-national comparability is not perfect. Comparability issues are thus flagged in 
the remainder of this section. Table 2 lists the number of observed households per country.5 
3.2 Welfare indicators: income and material deprivation 
                                                 
3 From a program management perspective reaching a non-poor but intended participant is also a success. 
4 For more information on the EU-SILC consult Eurostat's website: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/microdata/eu_silc   
5 Unless mentioned otherwise, all results are weighted taking survey design into account. The variables accounting 
for survey design have been programmed using the coding developed by Tim Goedeme (2011). 
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The pro-poorness assessments are performed using the pre-transfer income distribution and the 
pre-transfer material deprivation distribution. The first distribution is based on households` total 
disposable income before transfers. This variable is calculated as total disposable income minus 
the sum of family, housing and social exclusion allowances (European Commission, March 
2009a, p. 110-111). The income variable is largely comparable across these countries with main 
differences being the method of data collection (self-administered, interview or register) and 
whether income sources are collected in net or gross amounts (see Table A1 in the appendix). It 
should be noted that this definition only provides an approximate pre-transfer distribution 
because the transfer variables are collected in gross values while many transfers are subject to 
income tax.6 Moreover, though it is common practice to calculate the pre-transfer distribution 
using a static simulation technique, a limitation of this method is that it holds all other factors 
(including behavioural changes such as labour supply) constant. 
For illustrative purposes we have also included the official EU income-poverty rates in Table 2 
which vary from 10.7 per cent in the Netherlands to 21 per cent in the United Kingdom. This is 
the so-called ‘at-risk-of-poverty’ rate which has been calculated using the adult equivalent 
income distribution (using OECD-modified equivalence scales) and a threshold set at 60 per cent 
of national median income (p. 133). The limitations of using income as a poverty proxy have 
already been set out in the introduction of this paper.   
The second proxy is the pre-transfer material deprivation distribution which is based on the 
estimated number of deprivation items that the household cannot afford before the receipt of 
transfers. The deprivation items are stored as binominal variables and include the following 
items: 1) to pay rent or utility bills (i.e. payment arrears), 2) to keep the home adequately warm, 
3) to face an unexpected expense of about 800 Euro, 4) to eat meat, fish or a protein equivalent 
every second day, 5) a week holiday away from home, 6) a car, 7) a washing machine, 8) a 
colour TV, and 9) a telephone. As the data provide information on the items that a household 
cannot afford given their current post-transfer income, we estimate the pre-transfer distribution 
using a negative binomial regression model to estimate the income effect of (not having) the 
transfer on the number of material deprivations of the family. The methodology and results are 
explained in further detail in appendix 2.  
In the EU, these items are used to calculate the material deprivation rate; a household is 
considered materially deprived if they lack three or more items. These items were selected 
because they "reflect the lack of an ordinary living pattern common to a majority or large part of 
the population in the European Union and most of its Member States" (Guio, 2009, p. 3). The 
Eurobarometer survey provides an external validation for these items in the sense that these 
items are considered to be absolutely necessary or necessary by 50 per cent or more of the EU-27 
population (p. 4). While the survey questions have been designed to assess whether the 
households experiences an enforced lack of an item due to limited resources (rather than a 
preference based choice), the use of material deprivation indicators as a poverty proxy is not 
without its limitations. As their income increases, individuals` expectation about their material 
                                                 
6 While there is a simulated tax variable in the database (an estimate based on total household income), it is 
unfortunately not possible to deduct the net value of each transfer category. Consequently, the pre-transfer 
disposable income variable is thus likely to underestimate a household’s pre-transfer but post-tax disposable income.  
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well-being also tends to increase. Consequently, households with a lower living standard may 
report that "they do not want things that are impossible to obtain" (p. 3). Moreover, feelings of 
shame may result in underreporting of enforced lack of items.7 Also, material deprivation is a 
relative measure meaning that the list of deprivation items needs to be regularly reassessed 
including new items and dropping old items (p. 5). Unlike relative income-poverty, where the 
poverty threshold is automatically re-set every year by using the new median income, the 
material deprivation items are used for longer time periods and, in this case, are selected to 
reflect social necessities across 27 EU member states with considerably different average living 
standards.    
According to the commonly agreed EU definition, a household and all its members are 
materially deprived if they miss three or more deprivation items (Guio, 2009). Table 2 shows the 
item deprivation rates and the material deprivation rates at different cumulative deprivation 
thresholds: using the official threshold of three or more items material deprivation rates range 
from 6.0 per cent in Sweden to 13.8 per cent in Germany. As the selected countries have the 
highest average income levels in the EU, it is not surprising that some of the item deprivation 
rates are very close to zero (washing machine, colour TV and telephone). Table 2 also shows that 
the income poverty and material deprivation proxies overlap only partially: while 74 to 85 per 
cent of the population is not poor according to either proxy, 2-7 per cent is poor for both while 4-
16 per cent is poor according to one proxy but not the other. Using the two official proxies of the 
EU, these calculations show that the identification problem set out in the previous section is 
significant: the potential target population in the studied countries varies from 2-15 per cent in 
Sweden and the Netherlands to 5-26 per cent in Ireland. It is further very likely that these groups 
also differ in the extent to which they are poor as well as the circumstances explaining their 
situation.  
This paper focuses on the 20 per cent poorest population groups according to each welfare 
indicator (ranked from least to best well off) instead of the percentage of poor. This approach has 
the advantage that it yields equally sized target groups for each welfare indicator and, thus, that 
differences in pro-poorness are not simply due to differences in the generosity of poverty 
thresholds. It further takes into account that (escaping / entering) poverty is not a discrete event 
and that including the ‘near’ poor into the target group reduces welfare traps (see previous 
section).  
  
                                                 
7 Shame was also mentioned as a possible explanatory factor by Breunig and McKibbin (2011) who find that 
differences in survey design lead to differences in reporting deprivation. Using two Australian surveys with identical 
deprivation questions, deprivation rates collected through self-completed questionnaires were higher than those 
found in face-to-face computer assisted interviews.  
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Table 2: Summary statistics (unit of analysis: household) 
Observations DE FR IE NL SE UK 
# of households 14,015 9,973 5,522 10,010 6,734 8,679 
# of households with children (age 0-17) 3,711 3,445 1,605 3,595 2,616 2,497 
Income poverty (%)       
- 50% of national median income 11.3 6.8 10.3 5.1 7.2 12.6 
- 60% of national median income (income proxy) 17.9 12.7 21.4 10.3 11.6 20.8 
- 70% of national median income 25.8 20.2 31.1 20.5 19.5 28.9 
Material deprivation indicators (%)       
- payment arrears for rent or utility bills 5.1 8.5 7.0 3.7 4.7 6.7 
- cannot afford to keep home adequately warm 6.1 5.0 3.6 2.1 2.1 4.9 
- is not able to face unexpected expenses 1 38.9 33.0 39.2 23.6 20.3 26.0 
- cannot afford to eat meat, fish or a protein equivalent 
every second day 
12.1 6.7 2.1 2.2 3.9 4.0 
- cannot afford a week holiday away from home 25.4 30.2 20.7 17.0 13.5 20.5 
- cannot afford a car 7.3 3.9 10.0 8.0 5.3 5.4 
- cannot afford a washing machine 0.7 1.5 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.5 
- cannot afford a colour TV 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.1 
- cannot afford a telephone 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Number of deprivations (%)       
- 0 deprivations 53.3 56.1 55.8 68.6 72.2 67.1 
- 1 deprivation 18.9 17.5 20.9 15.6 13.5 12.8 
- 2 deprivations 14.1 14.6 13.3 8.9 8.2 10.4 
- 3 deprivations (mat. deprivation proxy) 7.9 6.7 5.7 4.7 4 5.8 
- 4 or more deprivations 5.8 5.1 4.3 2.2 2.0 4.1 
Overlap poverty proxies (%)       
- Both 6.9 4.3 5.3 2.0 2.0 4.7 
- Only income-poor  11.0 8.3 16.1 8.3 9.6 16.1 
- Only materially deprived 6.9 7.6 4.7 4.8 4.0 5.0 
- Neither 75.2 79.8 73.9 84.9 84.3 74.2 
Mean number of material deprivations 0.97 0.90 0.85 0.57 0.51 0.68 
.Mean disposable household income 2 20,009 18,775 25,529 20,904 19,840 24,342 
Mean income before transfers 2 19,242 17,881 23,681 19,835 19,014 22,959 
Mean transfer income 2 3 2,126 2,240 2,617 2,572 2,461 3,486 
1 Amount (in Euro) varies per member state: DE: 860, FR: 800, IE: 875, NL: 850, SE: 865 and UK: 733. 
2 Expressed in adult equivalent annual Euro amounts. 
3 Includes family, social exclusion and housing transfers; averaged over recipient households only. 
Source: EU-SILC (2007) 
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Table 3: Comparison income and material deprivation distributions (at 1st quintile) 
 DE FR IE NL SE UK 
Overlap first quintile (%)       
- Neither 71.1 71.4 71.1 71.9 69.7 70.7 
- Only 1st quintile income 8.9 8.6 8.8 8.1 10.3 9.2 
- Only 1st quintile materially deprivation 8.9 8.6 8.9 8.1 10.3 9.2 
- Both 11.1 11.4 11.2 11.9 9.7 10.8 
       
Mean disposable household income1   
- In either or both 1st quintiles 10,978 11,120 13,563 12,243 12,582 13,261 
- Only 1st quintile income 8,332 9,041 11,361 10,402 10,060 10,081 
- Only 1st quintile materially deprivation 12,405 12,007 14,675 13,243 14,038 15,179 
- In both 1st quintiles 8,781 9,027 11,613 10,833 10,379 10,915 
       
Mean income before transfers1  
(family, housing & social inclusion allowances)        
- In either or both 1st quintiles 9,415 9,034 9,787 9,203 10,899 9,745 
- Only 1st quintile income 6,607 6,496 6,947 6,463 7,928 5,732 
- Only 1st quintile materially deprivation 10,447 9,612 10,393 9,300 12,258 10,791 
- In both 1st quintiles 6,214 5,593 5,789 4,769 7,563 4,232 
       
Mean number of deprivations        
- In either or both 1st quintiles 2.42 2.22 2.12 1.67 1.47 1.94 
- Only 1st quintile income 2.21 1.92 1.90 1.45 1.18 1.66 
- Only 1st quintile materially deprivation 3.09 2.91 2.81 2.25 2.14 2.71 
- In both 1st quintiles 3.25 2.91 2.94 2.27 2.25 2.84 
       
Mean number of deprivations before transfers 
(family, housing & social inclusion allowances)  
      
- In either or both 1st quintiles 2.78 3.09 2.89 2.74 1.75 2.91 
- Only 1st quintile income 2.71 3.12 2.96 2.94 1.59 3.04 
- Only 1st quintile materially deprivation 3.59 4.06 3.85 3.74 2.54 4.07 
- In both 1st quintiles 4.09 4.86 4.74 4.74 3.04 5.31 
1 Expressed in adult equivalent annual Euro amounts. 
Source: EU-SILC (2007) 
 
Table 3 compares the 1st quintiles of the income and material deprivation indicators. With the 
effect of the poverty threshold removed, the overlap between the welfare distributions is now 
strikingly similar for the studied countries. About 30 per cent of the population is either in the 
lowest income quintile, the highest material deprivation quintile or both. And 10 per cent of the 
population is in the lowest quintile of both distributions. Due to the ranking process, the average 
income level of households in the 1st income quintile is lower than that of households in the 1st 
material deprivation quintile. Similarly, households in the 1st material deprivation quintile have 
on average a higher number of deprivations than households in the 1st income quintile. What is 
interesting though is that the group of households that is present in both quintiles is worst off in 
any indicator (pre or post transfer, income or material deprivation). 
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Just like choosing a poverty threshold the choice for looking at quintiles rather than quartiles for 
instance is somewhat arbitrary. Table 4 provides another perspective on the degree of overlap 
between the two welfare indicators: about a 20-30 per cent of the 1st quintile households are in 
the 2nd quintiles of the other distribution while 15-25 per cent are ranked in the three best off 
quintiles for the other indicator.  
 
Table 4: Rank of 1st quintile households ranked in the other welfare distribution (%) 
 DE FR IE NL SE UK 
In the 1st material deprivation quintile and:       
- In 1st income quintile 55.5 56.9 55.8 59.6 48.3 53.8 
- In 2nd income quintile 24.1 26.2 25.2 24.8 27.0 22.7 
- In 3-5th income quintiles 20.5 16.9 18.9 15.6 24.7 23.4 
       
In the 1st income quintile and:       
- In 1st material deprivation quintile 55.5 57.0 55.9 59.6 48.3 53.8 
- In 2nd material deprivation quintile 27.5 20.3 21.3 23.9 29.2 23.3 
- In 3-5th material deprivation quintiles 17.0 22.7 22.9 16.4 22.5 22.9 
Source: EU-SILC (2007) 
 
 
3.3 Income transfers 
This paper focuses on income transfers to test how the choice of welfare indicators influences the 
pro-poorness assessment of interventions for two reasons: firstly because income transfers 
represent a key instrument for supporting less well-off households in these countries and 
secondly, because this information is jointly available with the required income and material 
deprivation information.8 Social transfers in the EU-SILC are defined as “current transfers 
received by households during the income reference period and intended to relieve them from the 
financial burden of a number of risks or needs, made through collectively organised schemes, or 
outside such schemes by government units and Non Profit Institutions Serving Households” … 
“In order to be included as a social benefit, the transfer must meet one of two criteria. First, 
coverage is compulsory (under law, regulation or a collective bargaining agreement) for the 
group in question. Second, it is based on the principle of social solidarity (i.e. if it is an 
insurance-based pension, the premium entitlements are not proportional to the individual 
exposure to risk of the people protected).” … “Social benefits do not include benefits paid from 
schemes into which the recipient has made voluntary payments only, independently of his/her 
employer or government” (Commission Regulation (EC) No 1980/2003 of 21 October 2003).9 
We analyse three categories of income transfers separately and in several stages of aggregation: 
family and child related allowances, housing allowances and social exclusion transfers. These 
                                                 
8 For a detailed description of income and transfer variables we refer to the Description of SILC user database 
variables (European Commission, March 2009a) and the EU-SILC user database description (European 
Commission, March 2009b) which are also available online 
(https://circabc.europa.eu/faces/jsp/extension/wai/navigation/container.jsp).  
9 With acknowledgements to Van Rie and Marx (2011, p. 10-11) who assembled this definition from the EU-SILC 
documentation.  
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transfer categories were chosen because, in comparison to insurance based transfers, they are 
more likely to include last resort type of transfers i.e. transfers that aim at providing a basic 
minimum income. As poverty reduction is often an explicit objective, it makes sense to use these 
transfers as cases to test whether the pro-poorness assessment differs by welfare indicator. As the 
data for these categories have been collected at a household level and programme eligibility / 
transfer amounts are also often contingent on the household context, households are the unit of 
analysis. The reference population for social exclusion and housing allowances is the total 
household population; for family allowances where the reference population only includes 
households with children under the age of 18.10  
The transfer information used in this paper is stored in three EU-SILC variables that are labelled 
as “Family/children related allowances”, “Housing allowances” and “Social exclusion not 
elsewhere classified”. These variables report the amount of transfers received in the reference 
year and are claimed to be fully or largely comparable according to the data quality reports (see 
Table A1 in the appendix). A transfer variable may include a range of interventions whose 
programme design varies both within and between countries. Thus, even within one transfer 
category for one particular country, one might find universal, income-tested and means-tested 
allowances targeting different population groups with different eligibility criteria and different 
levels of generosity. While this variation allows for a good testing ground for the influence of 
using different poverty proxies, the grouping of several interventions into one category limits the 
scope for a more detailed analysis on the relation between different styles of programme design 
and the pro-poorness assessment.11 A further challenge is that the EU-SILC documentation fails 
to provide detailed information on what country specific arrangements are included in each 
category. To enhance the ability to triangulate and better interpret the results, this study 
addresses this challenge in two ways. Firstly, representatives of the national statistics offices 
were contacted to provide additional information on the included arrangements. Secondly, this 
study collected information on the main design features of each arrangement. Table 5 
summarizes the type of programmes (universal, income-tested or means-tested) that are included 
in the transfer categories for each county while Table 6 summarizes the incidence rates 
(coverage) and mean transfer amounts. More detailed information is provided in appendix 3.  
  
                                                 
10 Given the diversity in income transfer programs across countries the reference populations are an approximation. 
In some countries, family allowances also cover families with children above the age of 17 years while in other 
countries social assistance transfers only cover families with adults up to pensionable age while other transfer 
programs are in place to cover persons of pensionable age.  
11 It may well be that one welfare indicator is more successful in identifying a program's target group than another. 
In such a case, it may be appropriate to prefer a specific welfare indicator when conducting a program evaluation or 
impact assessment. 
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Table 5: Type of transfer programmes available (grey cells: not included in transfer 
variable)  
 DE FR IE NL SE UK
       
Family allowances       
Universal programmes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Income-tested programmes yes yes yes yes no yes 
Means-tested programmes no yes yes no no no 
Child care programmes for very 
young or sick children  
yes 
(stay at home 
parents) 
yes 
(sick 
children) 
yes 
(working 
parents) 
no yes 
 
no 
Maternity related programmes 
(contributions related or not) 
no no no no yes yes 
       
Social exclusion allowances       
Income-tested programmes no yes no yes yes yes 
Means-tested programmes yes no yes yes yes yes 
       
Housing allowances       
Income-tested programmes yes yes no no yes no 
Means-tested programmes no no yes yes no yes 
Source: own research, see also appendix 3.  
 
Table 6: Summary statistics of transfer indicators 
 DE FR IE NL SE UK 
Coverage        
Any household transfers (family, social exclusion, housing) 36.1 39.9 70.6 41.6 33.6 39.7 
- Social assistance (social inclusion and/or housing benefits) 8.0 26.2 32.3 20.3 10.7 18.5 
- Social inclusion  2.8 24.8 30.6 15.2 9.5 13.5 
- Housing  5.6 5.0 4.0 10.4 3.1 10.8 
- Family 2  98.3 79.2 99.8 95.8 84.5 94.5 
       
Mean amount of transfers (averaged over recipients only) 1       
Any household transfers (family, social exclusion, housing) 3,789 4,060 5,130 3,664 4,634 5,796 
- Social assistance (social inclusion and/or housing benefits) 4,670 3,346 2,262 6,975 3,594 8,156 
- Social inclusion 1,154 2,232 1,533 1,796 2,146 5,083 
- Housing 5,671 3,747 838 7,748 4,413 5,508 
- Family 2  3,752 3,681 6,692 1,699 4,665 3,460 
1 Expressed in annual Euro amounts. 
2 Only households with children age 17 or below.  
Source: EU-SILC (2007) 
 
Of the three transfer variables, the one on family allowances includes by far the widest range of 
transfer programmes. Triangulating the results from our own research with the information 
provided by representatives of the national statistics offices it is found that this variable is a 
‘catch all’ for universal, means-tested, income-tested and social insurance related transfers, 
which may be provided through transfer programmes or the income tax system. Furthermore, in 
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some cases important family related transfer programmes are either not incorporated or 
categorized under another transfer variable (indicated by the grey shaded cells in Table 5). The 
Netherlands, for instance, has quite a number of income-tested transfers which are distributed via 
the tax system but these programmes are not included in the family allowances variable or 
elsewhere. Maternity related programmes on the other hand tend to be classified under “Sickness 
benefits” (not studied in this paper) but are included as part of family related allowances for the 
UK. These limitations do not affect the analysis presented in the remainder of this paper: if we 
want to compare the performance of transfer categories and countries, the current information 
suffices. However, given these blind spots in the data, one has to be very cautious in interpreting 
the pro-poorness findings as reflective of actual national efforts to assist households as they do 
not necessarily represent all relevant parts of the transfer system in these countries.  
The summary statistics in Table 6 show that coverage rates among families with children under 
the age of 18 years are above 95 per cent for most countries thus confirming the role of universal 
programmes in this transfer category. 12  The lower coverage rate of France (80 per cent) can be 
attributed to the fact that only families with two or more children are eligible for the universal 
programme.13 In Sweden the universal allowance applies to children aged 0 to 16 years (or 20 if 
in full-time study) but these factors alone seem insufficient explanation of why 15 per cent of the 
households with children under 18 are not registered as receiving family allowances. Table 6 
further shows that there is quite some cross-national variation in the average amounts of family 
transfers. Dutch households receive on average the lowest amount but, as noted above, income-
tested transfers through the tax system are not included. The most generous amounts are found in 
Ireland, with households receiving on average close to 6,700 Euros annually.  
The social exclusion variable includes transfers provided as part of minimum income 
programmes as well as support for households with low (but above minimum) financial 
resources. Usually countries have a combination of transfer programmes managed by welfare 
offices and tax credits though the tax system. Eligibility always depends at minimum on an 
income-test and often on a means-test assessing both household’s income and assets. As with the 
family allowance variable, not all relevant transfers are included in this variable. For Germany, 
transfers from the non-contributory unemployment assistance programme (Arbeitslozengeld II) 
are grouped together with the unemployment insurance under the unemployment benefits 
variable, which may explain the very low coverage rate (2.8 per cent). Unemployment assistance 
in France is also not included but despite this the social exclusion coverage rate is very high (25 
per cent). For the Netherlands and Sweden the income-tested tax credit programmes are again 
not included. Furthermore, the asset-test in Ireland is very lenient (high maximum income and 
low claw back rate) which is consistent with the high coverage rate (31 per cent). In sum, our 
research indicates that the social exclusion variable includes either means-tested programmes 
only or a mix for (DE, IE, NL, SE, UK) or income-tested programmes only (FR and effectively 
                                                 
12 Universal should be interpreted here as not income- or means-tested. Other criteria such as age of the child, the 
number of children or whether the child is in full time education might in part determine eligibility and can thus 
explain why there is no full coverage among our benchmark households with children under the age of 18. 
13 We tested this hypothesis by calculating the coverage rate for families with two or more children. For this group 
the coverage rate is 97 per cent. 
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IE). In terms of generosity, the UK is an outlier with the average transfer amount being more 
than double that of the other countries. 
The housing allowances variable is the least complex. It includes only one transfer programme 
(or, in the UK, two complementary programmes with the same means-test). For two countries 
(NL, UK) the housing allowances are means-tested while for four countries the allowances are 
income-tested (DE, FR, SE and effectively IE because of a very lenient asset test). Coverage 
rates vary from 3 per cent in Sweden to 11 per cent in the UK. In terms of generosity, housing 
allowances are considerably lower in Ireland (800) with average amounts in the other countries 
varying from 3,700 (FR) to 7,700 (NL). 
We also aggregate the information to a variable including all household level transfers and joint 
variable for housing and social exclusion allowances. This is because the three transfer variables 
often include transfer programmes that are designed as complementary programmes. For 
instance, households receiving social exclusion allowances in the UK can additionally qualify for 
housing allowances and child related tax credits. 14 As a consequence, recipients of social 
exclusion transfers are thus more likely to also receive housing allowances. In comparison to 
other countries, Germany has low coverage in social assistance transfers. As explained above, 
this is likely due to the fact that recipients of unemployment assistance are counted as part of 
unemployment transfers. 
In sum, the above discussion has shown that there is a wide cross-national variation in coverage 
and generosity of transfers, thus providing a diverse sample to investigate the relationship 
between choice of pro-poorness indicator and the assessment of a programme’s success. The lack 
of overlap between pro-poorness indicators gives rise to the hypothesis that this assessment is 
expected to differ between income and material deprivation indicators. If the analysis provides 
evidence in favour of this hypothesis, then it would be desirable that programme evaluations 
would also include material deprivation and/or other indicators of financial well-being.  
 
3.4 Measures of pro-poorness / progressiveness 
This study uses three measures of pro-poorness because transfers may be pro-poor in one aspect 
but not according to another aspect. 15 The first measure is the coverage rate which is the 
percentage of families receiving the transfer which can be seen as a measure of success in 
reaching the target group. The second measure is the average transfer amount going to the first 
quintile of the well-being distribution. It is a measure for the generosity of the transfer. The third 
                                                 
14 Given the complementarity of the household level transfers, another way of assessing pro-poorness would be to 
assess the total amount of household transfers received by households with children receiving social assistance 
transfers.  
15 We also planned to include the share of total benefits received by the lowest quintile households (as a percentage 
of total benefit expenditures in the program) as a fourth performance indicator. However, the differences between 
point estimates with and without using population weights were very large. We tested whether the results would 
become more similar by top coding the values of outlier households in terms of high population weights and high 
benefit amounts but the differences in point estimates were still large. For the three performance indicators used in 
this paper, the differences between weighted and unweighted point estimates are small.  
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measure is the average benefit share which is measured as the contribution that transfers make to 
disposable income of 1st quintile households. The pro-poorness or progressiveness of a transfer 
increases as i. the percentage of first quintile households receiving the transfer increases, ii. the 
average amount of transfers distributed to the poorest households increases, iii. the benefit share 
increases.  
4. Results 
 
The aim of this paper is to find out whether one should be concerned that the current practice of 
using income as a performance indicator for assessing the pro-poorness of programmes 
systematically biases the judgement of a programme's success. Using the selected countries and 
categories of income transfers as a comparative case study, this section compares whether the 
'success rate' of such interventions to reach the poorest households significantly differs when 
using either an income or a material deprivation measure. As a reference group for the poor we 
look at the poorest 20 per cent of households according to each welfare indicator. The minimum 
criterion that should be met is statistical significance i.e. whether we can reject the null-
hypothesis that the point estimates of the performance indicators are the same. Given that we 
have six countries, three transfer categories (plus two aggregations of these categories) and three 
performance indicators, there are 90 cases on which this hypothesis is tested. There is reason for 
concern when there is a systematic pattern of rejections of the null hypothesis for these cases.  
 
Table 7: Summary of comparison performance indicators between 1st income and material 
deprivation quintiles (Number of times Wald test reported a P-value < 0.01) 
 By performance indicator1 Cases with P-value < 0.01 Total cases 
By country    
DE 2+1+3 6 15 
FR 3+4+3 10 15 
IE 1+0+0 1 15 
NL 3+1+1 5 15 
SE 1+3+4 8 15 
UK 1+1+3 5 15 
Total  11+10+14 35 90 
    
By transfer category    
Total transfers 6+4+4 14 18 
Housing & social exclusion 2+1+2 5 18 
Social exclusion 1+0+1 2 18 
Housing 2+2+3 7 18 
Family2 0+3+4 7 18 
Total 11+10+14 35 90 
Notes:  
1 Ordered as: coverage rate, average transfer amount, average income share of transfer 
2 Only including households with children under age 18 
 
Table 7 summarizes the number of times that there is a statistical significant difference in 
performance. In 35 out of 90 cases there is a significant difference in performance levels. Of 
those 35, the ‘total transfers’ category had the highest incidence (14), followed by France (10). 
Given that each of the countries has at least one universal family transfer programme, it is not 
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surprising that we find very similar coverage rates. Tables 4.1-4.3 in appendix 4 report the actual 
values of the performance indicator and the Wald test. Looking at the first performance indicator, 
it can be seen that the coverage rates for the first material deprivation quintile are higher than 
those for the first income quintile (Table 4.1). An assessment based on material deprivation 
would thus suggest a higher success rate in reaching the least well off. However, one would 
reach a different conclusion for the second and third performance indicators, where in all of the 
significant cases (10 +14) the first income quintile receives a higher average transfer amount 
which also represents a higher share of disposable income (Table 4.2). In sum, in about two 
thirds of the cases the performance indicators yield similar conclusions and, in the remaining 
cases, the coverage rate attributes more success when using material deprivation while the other 
two indicators suggest that transfers are assessed as more generous using income.  
 
Are these differences large enough to have policy relevance? For coverage rates we find 
percentage point differences ranging from 14 to 2 percentage points with the separate transfer 
categories having differences from 6 to 2 points. In terms of transfer amounts the difference 
ranges from 2,400 to 250 Euro annually. The largest differences are found for the aggregate 
transfer category and family allowances (most notably Sweden). The differences for income 
shares vary from 9 to 4 percent of disposable income. From the perspective of a household that is 
struggling to make ends meet, even modest amounts of 250 Euro would make a difference. From 
a programme evaluation perspective, however, most of the differences do not seem large enough 
to warrant reforms in terms of programme spending, delivery instruments and eligibility criteria. 
The case of family transfers in Sweden would be one that merits further investigation. 
 
Following from the acknowledgment that income and material deprivation proxies each have 
their limitations (as discussed in the introduction), it is generally argued that these proxies 
provide complementary information. Therefore this paper also investigates whether the joint use 
of these proxies would change the performance assessment. The approach taken is to compare 
the performance indicators between households who are least well-off according to both 
indicators with the two groups of households least well-off according to only one indicator. 
Table 3 showed that 10-11 percent of the household population is ranked in the first income 
quintile as well as in the first material deprivation quintile; about 9 percent of the households are 
ranked in the first income quintile only while a similar percentage is ranked in the first material 
deprivation quintile only. It was also shown that households that are in both first quintiles have 
on average the highest number of deprivations and the lowest income. The idea behind this is 
that by (also) focusing the performance assessment on this group of ‘consistent’ poor16, one is 
evaluating whether the transfer is successful in reaching that part of the population for which one 
can be more confident that it actually belongs to the target group.  
 
  
                                                 
16 The concept ‘consistent poor’ has been introduced and studied by Brian Nolan and Christopher Whelan in several 
publications (starting with 1996). 
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Table 8: Summary of comparison performance indicators between overlap groups  
(Number of times Wald test reported a P-value < 0.01) 
 By performance indicator1 Cases with P-value < 0.01 Out of 
By country    
DE    
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 4+2+5 11 15 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 4+5+5 14 15 
FR    
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 4+4+5 13 15 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 5+5+5 15 15 
IE    
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 2+4+4 10 15 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 4+4+5 13 15 
NL    
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 4+4+3 11 15 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 4+5+5 14 15 
SE    
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 4+3+3 10 15 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 4+5+5 14 15 
UK    
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 4+3+5 12 15 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 4+5+5 14 15 
Total     
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 22+20+25 67 90 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 25+29+30 84 90 
    
By transfer category    
Total transfers    
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 6+6+6 18 18 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 6+6+6 18 18 
Housing & social exclusion    
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 5+6+6 17 18 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 6+6+6 18 18 
Social exclusion    
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 6+2+5 13 18 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 6+5+6 17 18 
Housing    
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 5+3+4 12 18 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 6+6+6 18 18 
Family2    
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 0+3+4 7 18 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 1+6+6 13 18 
Total    
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 22+20+25 67 90 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 25+29+30 84 90 
Notes:  
1 Comparing performance indicators of households in both 1st quintiles (Q1y md) with those that are only in 1st income 
quintile (Q1y), and with those that are only in the 1st material deprivation quintile (Q1md)  
2 Ordered as: coverage rate, average transfer amount, average income share of transfer 
3 Only including households with children under age 18 
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The results are summarized in Table 8 while tables 4.4 to 4.6 in appendix 4 report the results in 
more detail. In 67 cases (out of 90) the performance indicators for the consistent poor differ 
statistically significant from that of the group that is only in the first income quintile. In 
comparison to households that are only in the first material deprivation quintile, differences are 
significant in 84 out of 90 cases. The consistent poor are much more likely to receive transfers 
than the other two groups. The differences in coverage rates are not only significant in a 
statistical sense but they are that large that they are also significant in a policy sense. Moreover, 
the consistent poor typically receive higher transfers than the other two groups and the transfer 
itself also represents a larger share of the household’s disposable income. Transfers thus appear 
much more successful if the assessment is based on a combination of well-being indicators. 
Only for family allowances this is not a consistent pattern. This is to be expected for the 
coverage rates as every country has at least one universal transfer programme in the family 
allowance variable.17 In terms of generosity of transfers, only in Ireland do consistent poor 
families receive higher transfers. In the other countries, these households receive similar benefit 
amounts as the households in the lowest income quintile only (Germany, France, Netherlands 
and the UK) or the households in the lowest income quintile are receiving higher amounts 
(Sweden).18 Across the board, it appears that the consistent poor families get the same treatment 
as the low income families. A potential point of concern is the fact that households that are only 
in the first material deprivation quintile receive a far less generous treatment.  
 
 
  
                                                 
17 Only for France the coverage rates of family transfers differ between groups. This is likely due to the fact that the 
universal transfer program in France only kicks in when a family has a second child while the other transfer 
programs have at least an income-test. 
18 For Sweden and the Netherlands these findings may be related to the fact that the income tested tax credits are not 
included in the family transfer variable. 
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5. Concluding discussion  
 
This research investigated whether the choice of welfare indicator influences the pro-poorness 
assessment of an intervention. The motivations underlying this work are, firstly, the consistent 
finding that there is a lack of overlap between monetary and non-monetary poverty measures 
and, secondly, the current practice of using a monetary indicator (income) as a performance 
indicator for assessing the pro-poorness of programmes. The implication of the first aspect is that 
welfare indicators frequently ‘disagree’ about whether a programme’s participant belongs to the 
target group or not. The second aspect further implies that the dominant use of income as a 
criterion could systematically over or underestimate the judgement of a programme's success. 
To investigate whether there is reason for concern, this study has taken a comparative approach 
involving six EU member states, three categories of income transfers and three performance 
indicators. The aim behind this selection of countries has been to exploit a natural variation in 
programme interventions while controlling for differences in living standard and data collection. 
As welfare indicators we used the official wellbeing proxies of the EU, namely income and 
material deprivation. This study focused on family, housing and social exclusion allowances 
because these transfer categories included programmes aimed at assisting the least well off. 
Section 3 shows that the [lack of] overlap between the income and material deprivation 
distributions19 is extremely similar across countries while the programme information shows a 
large variation in the coverage, generosity and design of transfer programmes. These findings 
confirm the appropriateness of case selection.  
Comparing the success between the 20 per cent poorest households in terms of income and those 
in terms of material deprivation, this study finds that the performance indicators yield similar 
conclusions in about two thirds of the cases. For the remainder of cases, the coverage rate 
attributes more success when using material deprivation while the other two indicators attribute 
more success when using income. While statistically significant, most of the performance 
differences do not seem large enough to warrant adjustments in terms of programme spending, 
delivery instruments and eligibility criteria. However, when combining the income and material 
deprivation indicators, the performance assessment is significantly different: with very few 
exceptions, transfers are much more successful in reaching households that are among the least 
well-off according to both indicators.   
Why is that transfers appear much more successful when the information from two noisy 
indicators is combined? As discussed in the introduction, key limitations of the income indicator 
are firstly that they do not take alternative resources into account (financial or otherwise) and, 
secondly, that they do not inform about the specific needs of households and the costs associated 
with them (such as chronic illness or a disability). As discussed in section three, key limitations 
of the material deprivation indicators are that for reasons of shame and (changes in) aspirations 
the less well off may not report that they miss a deprivation item due to financial constraints 
while better off households may be more inclined to report the reverse while the reason for not 
                                                 
19 Using the pre-transfer distributions and focusing on the overlap between the first quintiles of the material 
deprivation and income distributions. 
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having the item may be more related to spending priorities rather than insufficient resources. 
Thus part of the noise in each indicator is due to false negatives while another part is due to false 
positives. By combining the information from these indicators and imposing a stricter criterion, 
one reduces the noise caused by false positives i.e. households having (enough) alternative 
resources and of households whose deprivation levels are (in part) the result of choice rather than 
a lack of resources. Also, as income support programmes often use a combination of income and 
asset tests and / or have special provisions for households meeting other needs-based criteria, the 
stricter information criterion may better mimic the criteria according to which eligibility is 
determined in such programmes. However, this is not to say that the group of ‘consistent poor’ 
should be seen as the ‘true poor’ or ‘sole deserving’. Combing information on income and 
material deprivation does, for instance, not tell us much about special needs that a household 
may have. Furthermore, even if poverty reduction is the primary aim, there are additional reasons 
favoring a wider target group (as discussed in section 2).  
 
Concluding, this study has shown is that when survey data are used to assess the pro-poorness of 
income transfers, the dominant practice of using an income indicator is systematically 
underestimating the performance of such programmes. While not investigated in this paper, the 
differences are that substantial that they are likely to also influence cost effectiveness 
assessments. It would therefore be adviseable that other available information regarding 
households alternative resources, needs or living standard outcomes would be used. Material 
deprivation indicators appears to be a relatively simple and low cost way of doing so.20  
 
  
                                                 
20 This research does not suggest that it would be recommendable to use material deprivation as information on the 
basis of which to determine program eligibility. These indicators are not suitable because they can easily be 
manipulated by prospective beneficiaries. 
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Appendix 1: Comparison of income and material deprivation variables 
 
Table 1.1: Cross-national comparability of variables used to construct income and material deprivation proxies 
 DE FR IE NL SE UK 
Source income data 1 Self-administered 
questionnaire 
Interview Interview and 
register 
Register Register Interview 
Reference period income 
data 1 
2006 2006 12 months prior 
to interview 
2006 2006 12 months prior 
to interview 
Collected income data at 
component level in gross or 
net amounts1 
Gross Net of social 
contributions but 
gross of taxes 
Gross and net Gross Gross Gross and net 
Comparability of income 
variables2: 
      
- Disposable household 
income 
Fully  Fully  Fully  Largely  Fully  Largely  
- All income transfers 
(except pensions) 
Fully  Fully  Fully  Largely  Fully  Fully 
- Family / children related 
allowances 
Fully  Fully  Fully  Largely  Fully  Fully  
- Social exclusion payments 
(not elsewhere reported) 
Fully  Fully  Fully  Fully  Fully  Fully  
- Housing allowances Fully  Fully  Fully  Fully  Fully  Fully  
- Unemployment benefits Largely  Fully Fully Largely  Fully Fully 
- Sickness benefits Fully  Fully  Fully  Fully  Fully  Fully  
- Disability benefits Fully  Fully  Fully  Fully  Fully  Fully  
Reference period 
deprivation data3 
Past 12 months 
(arrears) or 
currently 
Past 12 months 
(arrears) or currently 
Past 12 months 
(arrears) or 
currently 
Past 12 months 
(arrears) or 
currently 
Past 12 months 
(arrears) or 
currently 
Past 12 months 
(arrears) or 
currently 
Comparability deprivation 
variables 3 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sources: 1 European Commission, 2007 Comparative final quality report, version 2, June 2010. 2 European Commission, 2005 Comparative final quality report, 
version 2, June 2008. 3 By means of comparison of relevant questions in questionnaires of each country. 
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Appendix 2: Estimation pre-transfer material deprivation distribution   
 
To assess whether transfers are reaching and assisting poor households, one requires knowing 
how well-off the household would have been without the transfer (family, housing and social 
exclusion allowances). If income is the welfare indicator, the pre-transfer amount is simply 
obtained by subtracting the transfer amount from disposable income. However, for the material 
deprivation indicator some extra efforts are required to assess the effect of the transfer on the 
capacity of households to afford the deprivation items. Using a multivariate regression method, 
we first estimate the income elasticity on the number of deprivations using disposable income 
(per equivalent adult, in logarithms); then we fit the model to each household to estimate the 
number of deprivations using pre-transfer and post-transfer income; subsequently we add this 
estimate of the change in deprivations to the actual (post-transfer) number of deprivations 
reported by the household. 21 22 23 
 
Because the dependent variable is a count variable (i.e. the number of items that the household 
lacks) its distribution is more akin to a Poisson type of distribution rather than a normal 
distribution. This implies that a standard regression technique such as Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) is not appropriate. Instead we estimate a negative binomial regression model because the 
dependent variable only has non-negative values and is overdispersed (i.e. the variance that is 
larger than the mean). This choice is supported by a likelihood-ratio test which tests whether the 
variance is equal to the mean (LR test of Alpha); as shown by the p-values in Table A2 this 
hypothesis is rejected implying that there is overdispersion in the data. The regressions are run 
for each country separately. 
 
In addition to disposable income (adult equivalent, in natural logarithm) we include a range of 
control variables describing characteristics of the household and the respondent to the household 
questionnaire. Included are24:  
 the demographic composition of the household (number of children, adults and elderly as 
well as a range of dummies specifying the household type) 
 its (lack of) financial assets (two dummy variables indicating whether the household finds 
that its debt is somewhat or a heavy financial burden) 
 ownership dwelling (a dummy for whether the household is renting their home)  
 the respondent’s education level (highest level attained) 
                                                 
21 Using the non-linear prediction syntax “nlpredict” in Stata 11. More information can be found in the do-files and 
log-files which are available upon request by the author. 
22 We prefer to use the actual distribution plus the simulated income effect (i.e. the change in number of deprivations 
between pre- and post-transfer income) because the simulated income effect is the best available (but not perfect) 
estimate of the impact of transfers.  
23 We further adjust the pre-transfer deprivation count such that the values fall within the feasible range of 0-9 
deprivations as some household's estimated rank changes would be larger than what is actually feasible given that 
we only observe 9 deprivation items. 
24 There were a number of other variables which we would have liked to include but they were either not available 
(such as home food production, access to services, food banks) or had many missing observations (such as the 
household level work intensity variable for Germany, payment of wealth taxes).  
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 the respondent’s citizenship (local, EU and Other) 
 the respondent’s self-reported economic status (working, unemployed, studying, retired, 
permanently disabled, fulfilling domestic tasks)  
The regression results are summarized in Table A2. Due to the logarithmic transformation of the 
income variable its parameter can (by approximation) be interpreted as the percentage change. 
For instance, a 1 per cent increase in income decreases the number of deprivations by 0.57 per 
cent in Germany. The other parameters have the expected signs and most of them are statistically 
significant at a 5 per cent level or better.  
 
These estimates are subsequently used to estimate the change in deprivations due to transfer 
income. Taking for example a German household experiencing 2 deprivations with an annual 
pre-transfer income of € 10,000 and receiving € 1,000 in transfers the predicted change in 
deprivations is: 2-[2*exp(-0.573*(ln(11,000)-ln(10,000))]=2-1.89=0.11 deprivations. Thus, 
without the transfer we would expect this household to have 2.11 deprivations. While one would 
never observe a non-integer value for the number of deprivations, a convenient side effect of 
non-integer values is that the pre-transfer material deprivation distribution becomes less discrete 
which in turn facilitates the division of the population in quintiles.25 
 
Table 2.1: Negative binomial regression 
Dependent variable: number of deprivation items that a household cannot afford (0-9 items) 
 DE FR IE NL SE UK 
Disposable income (per equivalent adult, 
in logarithms) 0.573*** 0.422*** 0.674*** 0.486*** 0.537*** 0.629*** 
Debt is heavy burden (1/0) 2.165*** 2.104*** 1.902*** 2.625*** 3.892*** 2.585*** 
Debt is somewhat a burden (1/0) 1.377*** 1.524*** 1.306*** 1.911*** 2.254*** 1.445*** 
Number of children below age 18 1.104** 0.974 1.054 1.079 1.123* 1.002 
Number of adults 1.013 0.923 0.912 1.069 1.084 0.888* 
Number of elderly (age 65 and above) 0.919 0.865 0.777* 0.571*** 0.86 0.569*** 
Tenure status       
- Owned (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 
- Rented 1.760*** 1.833*** 2.202*** 2.409*** 1.826*** 2.753*** 
Household type       
- One person household (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 
- 2 adults, no dependent children, both 
adults under 65 years 0.733*** 0.704*** 1.062 0.487*** 0.509*** 0.778** 
- 2 adults, no dependent children, at least 
one adult 65 years or more 0.640*** 0.783* 1.023 1.063 0.372*** 1.124 
- Other households without dependent 
children 0.899 0.882 1.091 0.621 0.531** 1.003 
                                                 
25 Consequently, for households that do not report receiving any transfers (family, housing or social exclusion 
allowances) the number of deprivations stays the same (an integer value). Thus while the static simulation 
transforms the material deprivation distribution from a 10 value discrete distribution into a more continuous 
distribution there are still high frequency integer values. In a number of cases these values are distributed around the 
threshold value of the quintile. To obtain quintiles, we additionally sorted households firstly by using the variable 
“ability to make ends meet” (taking values 1 - very difficult - to 6 - very easy -) and secondly, using pre-transfer 
income. 
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- Single parent household, one or more 
dependent children 1.061 1.013 1.356* 1.063 0.897 1.280** 
- 2 adults, one dependent child 0.732*** 0.817* 0.911 0.624* 0.562*** 0.898 
- 2 adults, two dependent children 0.615*** 0.713** 0.929 0.454*** 0.452*** 0.869 
- 2 adults, three or more dependent 
children 0.662* 0.859 0.939 0.392** 0.487** 1.035 
- Other households with dependent 
children 0.740* 0.975 1.168 0.583 0.404*** 1.319 
- Other 1.299 0.796 na 0.000*** 1.354 1.196 
Highest education level attained       
- Pre-primary education  (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
- Primary education na 0.914 na 1.426 na na 
- Lower secondary 0.907 0.900 0.764*** 1.112 0.725** na 
- Upper secondary 0.761*** 0.759** 0.609*** 0.981 0.803* 0.817*** 
- Post secondary (non-tertiary) 0.607*** 0.000*** 0.617*** 1.006 0.744* 0.951 
- First or second stage tertiary 0.531*** 0.524*** 0.409*** 0.629 0.561*** 0.566*** 
Country of citizenship       
- Local (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 
- EU na 0.996 1.123 1.334 0.995 1.101 
- Other 1.184* 1.419*** 1.032 4.608*** 1.349* 1.413*** 
Self-defined economic status       
- Working full-time (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 
- Working part-time 1.240*** 1.281*** 1.286** 1.196* 1.649*** 1.370*** 
- Unemployed 1.957*** 1.545*** 1.695*** 1.974*** 2.330*** 1.803*** 
- Pupil, student or otherwise in training 1.312*** 1.073 2.141*** 1.243 1.832*** 1.1 
- Retired 1.046 0.905 1.066 1.117 1.573*** 1.257** 
- Permanently disabled / unfit for work 1.770*** 1.393*** 1.834*** 2.126*** 2.865*** 1.924*** 
- In compulsory military / community 
service 1.31 1.160* 1.354*** 1.443*** 1.619* 1.525*** 
- Fulfilling domestic tasks and care 
responsibilities 1.129* 1.323* 3.272*** 1.442** 1.720** 1.002 
- Other inactive person 1.528*** 1.281*** 1.286** 1.196* 1.971*** 1.370*** 
Number of households 14015 9973 5522 10010 6734 8679 
LR test of Alpha – P-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LR Chi 2 – P-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.1457 0.1386 0.1853 0.1857 0.1681 0.1752 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; not available (na); estimated in Stata 11 using nbreg command. 
Source: EU-SILC (2007) 
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Appendix 3: Characteristics of household level transfers  
Table 3.1: Summary family allowances: type of programmes 
 DE FR IE NL SE UK 
Universal programmes y y y y y y 
Income-tested programmes y y y y n y 
Means-tested programmes n y y n n n 
Child care programmes for very young or sick children y 
(stay at home 
parents) 
y 
(sick 
children) 
y 
(working 
parents) 
n y 
 
n 
Maternity related programmes 
(contributions related or not) 
n n n n y y 
Notes: shaded cells indicate that transfer is not included in respective EU-SILC transfer variable (HY050G/N). 
 
Table 3.2: Family allowances - if included in HY050G/N printed in bold (monthly amounts) 
 DE FR IE NL SE UK 
Universal 
programmes 
 
Kindergeld1  
184 € (1st & 2nd child) 
190 € (3rd child) 
215 € (4th and more) 
 
 
Prestation 
d’acceuil du jeune 
enfant (PAJE)3 
374-611 €, 
supplement for 
reduced work 
(CLCA?) 
X?, supplement for 
child care (CMG?) 
 
Allocation 
familiale3 
124 € 2 children 
283 € 3 children 
441 € 4 children 
159 € per 
subsequent child 
Supplements for 
children above age 
11 
 
Child benefit5 
166 € per child 
 
Early child care 
supplement 
(≤2009)5 
83 € per child 
 
 
Kinderbijslag6 
Amount varies age of 
child and by number 
of children 
65-128 € per child 
 
Barnbidrag7 
Amount varies by 
number of children 
114-227 € per child 
 
Child benefit 8 
94 € 1st child 
62 € ≥ 2nd child 
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Allocation 
journalière de 
présence 
parentale3 
max. 902-1078 € 
 
Allocation de 
Soutien Familial 
(ASF)4 
€ 85 per child 
Means-tested (MT) 
/ income tested (IT) 
 
Kinderzuschlag 
(MT)1 
max. 140 € per child 
 
Erziehungsgeld (IT) 
(≤ 2007)2 
€300 for 24 months / 
€450 for 12 months 
Prestation 
d’acceuil du jeune 
enfant (PAJE) 
(IT)3 
890 € birth grant, 
lump sum 
178 € base 
allowance 
 
Allocation 
familiale (IT)3 4 
161 €, for 3 or more 
children 
 
Allocation de 
rentrée scolaire 
(ARS)3 
281-307 €, 
depending on age 
 
Allocation de 
parent isolé (API) 
(MT)4 
187 € per child  
Qualified child 
increase5 
26 € per child 
 
Family income 
supplement (IT)5 
60% between net 
earnings and net 
maximum earnings 
 
Back to school 
clothing and 
footwear 
allowance (MT)5 
200-305 € annually, 
depending on age 
 
One parent family 
payment (IT)5 
max. 1600 €  
 
Single parent 
family relief 
€1,760 tax credit 
 
Home carers 
allowance 
Up to 770 tax credit 
Kinderkorting/kindert
oeslag / 
kindgebonden 
budget (IT)6 
77-152 € depending 
on programme and 
number of children 
 
Alleenstaande 
ouderkorting (IT)6 
79 € 
 
Aanvullende 
alleenstaande 
ouderkorting (IT)6 
4.3% of earned 
income with max. of 
126 € 
 
Combinatiekorting / 
aanvullende 
combinatiekorting 
(IT) / 
inkomensafhankelijke 
combinatiekorting 
(IT) 6 
 
Tax allowance for 
supporting a child 
No child related tax 
credits 
Child tax credit 
(IT) 8 
Basic family 
element: 53 € ≥1 
child 
Baby addition: 53 € 
per child 
Child element: 222 
€ per child 
Disability element: 
262 € per child 
Severe disability 
element: 106 € per 
child 
 
Maternity grants 
(IT) 8 
516 € birth grant 
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under age 30 
25-89 € depending on 
age child and 
expenses 
 
Kinderopvangtoeslag 
(IT) 
Covering 95-50% of 
child care costs. 
Contributions 
based 
Elterngeld (≥ 2007)2 
min. 300 € – max. 
1800 €, depending on 
income 
   Föräldraledighet & 
temporary parents 
cash benefit 
min. 409 € – max. 
1,480 €, depending 
on contributions 
record 
 
 
Statutory 
maternity / 
paternity / 
adoption pay 8  
Up to 90% of gross 
earnings, up to 39 
weeks, employment 
& earnings history 
Other programmes Ehegattensplitting1,  
Entlastungsbetrag für 
Alleinerziehende1,  
contributions for 
mothers to old age 
insurance system,  
other minor transfers, 
maternity allowance 
 Early childhood 
care and education 
scheme (≥2010)5 
Bevallingsuitkering6 
100%, up to 16 weeks 
 Maternity 
allowance 8 
Max. € 579, up to 
39 weeks, , 
employment & 
earnings history 
 
Guardians 
allowance, Child 
maintenance bonus, 
Lone parent's 
benefit run-on, 
Carer's allowance  
Sources Germany:  
1 Tarki 2010, Kindergeld (age 0-17) becomes tax allowance after certain income level resulting in higher benefit levels (own research: this is likely what is called 
Kinderfreibetrag & Betreuungsfreibetrag which applies for households with an annual income as of 60,000 €); Kinderzuschlag (age 0-17) is part of means-tested 
unemployment benefit and social assistance and is targeted at households that fall below the needs threshold for means-tested unemployment benefits. 
(Arbeitslosengeld II); Ehegattensplitting are tax advantages for married couples; Entlastungsbetrag für Alleinerziehende is a tax exemption for single parents. 
2 Own research: Elterngeld is for parents who stop working or reduce their work hours because of the birth of a child (up to 14 months), does not apply to parents 
earning annually more than € 500,000; Erziehungsgeld is a means-tested supplementary allowance for women who stayed home to look after a newborn (up to 24 
months). 
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Sources France:  
3 Own research: Allocation familiale (age 0-20); Prestation d’acceuil du jeune enfant (IT, age 0-3), IT is quite generous up to € 33,700-59,400 (varying by 
number of children & single parent); Allocation journalière de présence parentale is a care allowance for parents with a sick child (up to 12 months); the income-
test threshold for the Allocation de rentrée scolaire varies from €27,500-32,600 depending on number of children. 
4 Tarki 2010: Allocation familiale (IT) is a supplementary allowance for families with 3 or more children; Allocation de Parent Isolé (API) is MT for income 
below € 748 per month. 
 
Sources Ireland: Child benefit and qualified child increase (age 0-17, higher if child in education); Early child care supplement (age 0-5). 
5 Tarki 2010 & own research: Early childhood care and education scheme provides one free pre-school year of early child care for all children between ages 3-4; 
to qualify for FIS one of parents must be engaged in insurable employment (max. net earnings for a one child family are €24,960 annually). 
 
Sources Netherlands: 
6 Own research: Kinderbijslag (age 0-17, for children born after1 Jan 1995 only age is a benefit determinant); Kinderkorting (≤2007)/ kindertoeslag (2008)/ 
kindgebonden budget (≥2009) are all income-tested tax benefits (paid monthly & nearly automatic) with full benefits until €28,897 after which a 6.5 per cent 
claw back applies; Bevallingsuitkering is for unemployed and self-employed women (16 weeks at 100 per cent pay with max. of €190 a workday); As of 2011, 
Alleenstaande ouderkorting & Aanvullende alleenstaande ouderkorting (IT) are combined; Combinatiekorting & aanvullende combinatiekorting have been 
replaced by the inkomensafhankelijke combinatiekorting in 2009, the changes also included changes in design (requiring minimum earnings of €4,734 & 
increase in max. tax credits from 9 to 160 € monthly. 
 
Sources Sweden: 
7 Own research: Barnbidrag (age 0-16 or 20 if full-time student); Föräldraledighet and temporary parents cash benefit (the parental cash benefit is contributions-
based but also has a basic amount for parents with low or no income; is part of sickness insurance and thus more likely to be found under sickness benefits). 
 
Sources UK:  
8 Own research: 1£ is €1.16 (31-12-2010), Child benefit (age 0-15 or 19 if in non-advanced education); Child tax credit is IT using several thresholds with 
different claw back rates (> € 18,780, 39 per cent; > € 58,000, 6.7 per cent); Maternity allowance is for women who have a work history but do not get statutory 
maternity pay through their employer; the Maternity Grant is a social fund grant. 
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Table 3.3: Summary social exclusion allowances: type of programmes 
 DE FR IE NL SE UK 
Income-tested programmes n y  n y y y 
Means-tested programmes y n y y y y 
Notes: shaded cells indicate that transfer is not included in respective EU-SILC transfer variable (HY060G/N). 
 
   
Table 3.4: Social exclusion allowances - if included in HY060G/N printed in bold (monthly amounts)  
 DE FR IE NL SE UK 
Means-tested 
(MT) 
/ income tested 
(IT) 
 
Arbeitslosengeld II & 
Sozialgeld (MT)1 
364 € for 1st adult, 
328 € for 2nd adult, 
215-291 € for each 
child (age dependent) 
 
Insertion 
minimum income 
(IT)2  
€447.91 single 
person 
€671.87 two-
member household 
€806.24 three-
member household 
€940.61 couple with 
two children 
a supplement of 
€179.16 is paid for 
each additional 
child in a family ≥ 2 
children. 
 
Unemployment 
assistance (IT)2 
Amounts not clear, 
as previous? 
Supplementary 
Welfare Allowance 
(MT)3 
€742 single 
€1236 two adults 
€1324 two adults 
and one child 
Bijstandsuitkering 
(MT)4 
€1319.85, couple  
€923.90, single parent 
€659.93, single adult  
 
Zorgtoeslag (IT) 
max. €146 for couple 
with 2 young children 
Försörjningsstöd 
(MT)5  
€516, couple  
€440 and up, single 
parent 
€285, single adult  
 
Earned income tax 
credit (IT) 
max. €99 for a person 
with average 
municipal tax rate 
  
Working tax 
credit (IT)6 
Basic element: 
€186 
Couples element:  
€183 
Lone parent 
element: €183 
30 hour element: 
€ 76  
Disability 
element: € 248 
Severe disability 
element: € 106 
Child care costs 
(max.): 
€ 812 1 child 
€ 1,382 ≥ 2 
children 
 
Income Support 
(MT)6 
Single person: € 
304 
Lone parents: € 
304 
Couples: € 477 
   
Community 
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Care Grant (IT) 
Discretionary 
 
Other 
programmes 
     Social fund 
grants, 
Other benefit, 
Grant for 
funeral expenses
Sources Germany: 
1 Own research: Arbeitslosengeld II is a means-tested allowance covering persons who are capable of work, not eligible anymore for the contributions-based 
unemployment benefit and who are unable to cover their basic needs; Sozialgeld is the allowance for their dependents and also covers the cost of reasonable 
accommodation and heat, as well as any additional special needs for the household. Qualifiable with income up to 1,200 € (1,500 € if children) and low assets 
(complex threshold). 
 
Sources France: 
2 Own research: Insertion minimum income: The benefit is reduced by the value of any income. If the beneficiary receives the housing allowance (see Family 
Allowances) or other housing assistance benefits, the insertion minimum income is reduced to a fixed lump sum. 
 
Sources Ireland: 
3 Own research: SWA is subject to income (max. SWA allowance) and asset tests (value of home not included, very lenient i.e. only €1 per €1,000 [between 
€5,000-15,000] is taken into account). 
 
Sources Netherlands: 
Own research: Bijstandsuitkering supplements up to minimum wage including income (minimum wage) and asset (max. € 5,555 (single) – 11,110 (couple)) tests; 
Zorgtoeslag compensates for out of pocket expenditures in health insurance premiums and has income thresholds for single parents (< €36,022) for couples (< 
€54,264). 
 
Sources Sweden:  
5 Own research: Försörjningsstöd varies with number of household members and age of child; the earned income tax credit was only introduced in 2007 and is 
thus not included in the EU-SILC income reference year for wave 2007.  
 
Sources UK: 
6 Own research: the working tax credit is income tested and two thresholds with claw back rates apply (> € 7,447, 39 per cent; > € 58,000, 6.7 per cent); the 
Community Care Grants is a social fund grant; Income Support is to help people on low incomes who do not have to be available for employment and have 
income <€ 7,447 and savings < € 6,960 (also includes clawback for people having savings up to € 18,560). 
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Table 3.5: Summary housing allowances: type of programmes 
 DE FR IE NL SE UK 
Income-tested programmes y y n n y n 
Means-tested programmes n n y y n y 
 
  
Table 3.6: Housing allowances - if included in HY070G/N printed in bold (monthly amounts)  
 DE FR IE NL SE UK 
Means-tested 
(MT) 
/ income tested 
(IT) 
 
Wohngeld (IT) 
Average monthly 
amount: € 91 
Family housing benefit 
(ALF) 
Aide personnalisée au 
logement (APL) 
Social housing subsidy 
(ALS) 
Average monthly 
amount: € 190   
(ALF, APL & ALS 
combined)  
Rent and mortgage 
supplements (MT) 
Max. amounts: 
Single person: €520 
Couple: €800 
Couple with 2 
children: €1,200 
Huurtoeslag (MT) 
i.e. max. €266 for 
couple with 2 young 
children with annual 
income of €17,000 
 
 
Bostadsbidrag (IT) 
i.e. max. €1,151 
(before income test) 
Housing 
benefit (MT) 
max. € 348 
 
Council tax 
benefit (MT) 
max. € 28 
Source Germany: Own research: Wohngeld is for anyone with low income or high rent except for recipients of unemployment assistance.  
 
Source France: Tarki 2010: ALF is for married couples (first 5 years) and families with dependent children; APL is for those renting registered accommodation 
and new homeowners who have been allocated subsidized loans; ALS is payable to anyone irrespective of age or employment; typically the allowance is a 
variable monthly amount is paid depending on rent level, income, and the number of children 
 
Source Ireland: Own research: Rent and mortgage supplements: same income and asset tests as for Supplementary Welfare Allowance. 
 
Source Netherlands: Own research: Huurtoeslag, the amount depends on composition household, rent amount, income (max. €29,125) and assets (€20,661). 
 
Source Sweden: Own research: Bostadsbidrag depends on household composition, rent amount and income (max. €12,647 (lone parents) or €6,324 (family with 
1 or more child); for social assistance recipients the rent may be fully covered. 
 
Source UK: Own research: Housing benefit applies the same asset test as Income Support but the income threshold is higher with € 21,474; for the Council tax 
benefit, which is a tax rebate, the same MT criteria apply as for the housing benefit. 
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Appendix 4: Comparison performance indicators 
 
Table 4.1: Coverage at lowest quintile (%) 
 All transfers Housing &  
Social exclusion 
Social exclusion Housing Family 1 
DE      
1st quintile income 51.6 30.1 20.6 11.1 98.4 
1st quintile material 
deprivation 
65.9 31.5 22.9 10.2 98.7 
P-value 2 0.000 0.153 0.009 0.164 0.662 
FR      
1st quintile income 76.3 69.1 19.6 64.8 95.7 
1st quintile material 
deprivation 
82.5 74.0 18.7 70.8 92.3 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.455 0.000 0.036 
IE      
1st quintile income 88.7 58.1 12.7 53.0 99.8 
1st quintile material 
deprivation 
92.2 54.4 13.4 48.9 99.8 
P-value 0.002 0.179 0.616 0.130 0.999 
NL      
1st quintile income 68.6 58.9 38.1 45.9 96.8 
1st quintile material 
deprivation 
73.4 64.3 37.4 51.9 95.9 
P-value 0.003 0.001 0.722 0.002 0.556 
SE      
1st quintile income 56.4 36.1 12.0 32.4 84.1 
1st quintile material 
deprivation 
62.3 37.7 12.7 33.4 84.7 
P-value 0.000 0.316 0.498 0.517 0.747 
UK      
1st quintile income 65.6 57.8 37.6 46.0 97.8 
1st quintile material 
deprivation 
72.8 59.0 37.7 48.1 96.2 
P-value 0.000 0.395 0.980 0.134 0.104 
Notes:  
1 Only including households with children under age 18 
2 This is the P-value from the adjusted Wald test testing the equivalence of the mean coverage rate. The standard 
errors take survey design into account. The variables accounting for survey design have been programmemed using 
the coding developed by Tim Goedeme (2011). 
Source: EU-SILC (2007) 
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Table 4.2: Average transfer amounts received by lowest quintile (%) 
 All transfers Housing &  
Social exclusion 
Social exclusion Housing Family 1 
DE      
1st quintile income 5,096 4,562 5,994 1,238 4,363 
1st quintile materially 
deprivation 4,623 4,670 5,894 1,171 4,123 
P-value 2 0.001 0.673 0.761 0.412 0.030 
FR      
1st quintile income 5,802 3,702 3,662 2,839 4,940 
1st quintile materially 
deprivation 4,880 3,346 3,608 2,541 4,387 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.749 0.000 0.003 
IE      
1st quintile income 9,066 2,090 758 2,110 12,348 
1st quintile materially 
deprivation 8,810 2,262 649 2,339 12,306 
P-value 0.545 0.307 0.200 0.204 0.932 
NL      
1st quintile income 7,317 7,608 9,491 1,885 2,102 
1st quintile materially 
deprivation 6,713 6,975 9,391 1,879 1,810 
P-value 0.058 0.065 0.763 0.895 0.000 
SE      
1st quintile income 6,543 3,986 5,218 2,517 7,445 
1st quintile materially 
deprivation 4,795 3,594 4,745 2,258 5,082 
P-value 0.000 0.026 0.184 0.005 0.000 
UK      
1st quintile income 10,603 8,273 6,031 5,456 6,031 
1st quintile materially 
deprivation 9,632 8,156 5,925 5,356 5,624 
P-value 0.001 0.639 0.555 0.637 0.084 
Notes:  
1 Only including households with children under age 18 
2 This is the P-value from the adjusted Wald test testing the equivalence of the mean transfer amount. The standard 
errors take survey design into account. The variables accounting for survey design have been programmemed using 
the coding developed by Tim Goedeme (2011). 
Source: EU-SILC (2007) 
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Table 4.3: Average income share of benefit at lowest quintile 
 All transfers Housing &  
Social exclusion 
Social exclusion Housing Family 1 
DE      
1st quintile income 0.349 0.328 0.424 0.102 0.263 
1st quintile material 
deprivation 0.274 0.316 0.391 0.097 0.226 
P-value 2 0.000 0.249 0.006 0.425 0.000 
FR      
1st quintile income 0.399 0.321 0.400 0.222 0.226 
1st quintile material 
deprivation 0.335 0.282 0.395 0.190 0.198 
P-value 0.006 0.130 0.959 0.000 0.001 
IE      
1st quintile income 0.419 0.118 0.043 0.119 0.513 
1st quintile material 
deprivation 0.363 0.108 0.034 0.111 0.474 
P-value 0.010 0.138 0.160 0.240 0.063 
NL      
1st quintile income 0.506 0.542 0.675 0.135 0.103 
1st quintile material 
deprivation 0.465 0.497 0.675 0.130 0.083 
P-value 0.108 0.103 0.997 0.125 0.000 
SE      
1st quintile income 0.331 0.278 0.356 0.178 0.294 
1st quintile material 
deprivation 0.244 0.241 0.321 0.150 0.204 
P-value 0.000 0.005 0.215 0.001 0.000 
UK      
1st quintile income 0.598 0.489 0.329 0.345 0.327 
1st quintile material 
deprivation 0.510 0.457 0.311 0.317 0.289 
P-value 0.000 0.004 0.086 0.001 0.010 
Notes:  
1 Only including households with children under age 18 
2 This is the P-value from the adjusted Wald test testing the equivalence of the mean coverage rate. The standard 
errors take survey design into account. The variables accounting for survey design have been programmemed using 
the coding developed by Tim Goedeme (2011). 
Source: EU-SILC (2007) 
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Table 4.4: Coverage by overlap groups (%, in both 1st quintiles (Q1y md), only in 1st income 
quintile (Q1y), only in 1st material deprivation quintile (Q1md))  
 All transfers Housing &  
Social exclusion 
Social exclusion Housing Family 1 
DE      
Q1y md  69.6 45.8 33.3 15.2 98.7 
Q1y  29.2 10.5 4.8 5.9 97.9 
Q1md  61.3 13.6 10.0 3.9 98.6 
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.524 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.936 
FR      
Q1y md  93.2 88.7 29.9 83.8 97.9 
Q1y  54.0 43.2 5.9 39.8 91.5 
Q1md  68.4 54.5 4.0 53.8 81.4 
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IE      
Q1y md  94.8 60.5 16.8 53.2 99.8 
Q1y  81.0 55.1 7.3 52.8 100.0 
Q1md  89.0 46.8 9.1 43.5 100.0 
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 2 0.000 0.108 0.000 0.900 . 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.007 . 
NL      
Q1y md  86.5 81.1 56.6 65.3 96.3 
Q1y  42.1 26.1 10.7 17.2 97.6 
Q1md  53.9 39.5 8.9 32.2 95.4 
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.424 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.621 
SE      
Q1y md  74.2 59.5 21.4 53.7 85.7 
Q1y  39.7 14.3 3.1 12.5 82.3 
Q1md  51.2 17.3 4.5 14.4 83.5 
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.278 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.422 
UK      
Q1y md  89.5 83.9 58.4 71.5 98.2 
Q1y  37.9 27.3 13.5 16.4 96.6 
Q1md  53.4 29.9 13.5 20.9 90.6 
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.318 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 
Notes:  
1 Only including households with children under age 18 
2 This is the P-value from the adjusted Wald test testing the equivalence of the mean coverage rate. The standard 
errors take survey design into account. The variables accounting for survey design have been programmemed using 
the coding developed by Tim Goedeme (2011). 
Source: EU-SILC (2007) 
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Table 4.5: Transfer amounts by overlap groups (%, in both 1st quintiles (Q1y md), only in 1st 
income quintile (Q1y), only in 1st material deprivation quintile (Q1md))  
 All transfers Housing &  
Social exclusion 
Social exclusion Housing Family 1 
DE      
Q1y md  5,390 4,888 6,150 1,262 4,283 
Q1y  4,222 2,783 4,643 1,163 4,515 
Q1md  3,537 3,755 4,830 732 3,821 
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 2 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.405 0.260 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.004 
FR      
Q1y md  6,195 4,131 3,832 3,007 5,052 
Q1y  4,904 2,533 2,522 2,372 4,708 
Q1md  2,515 1,661 1,374 1,583 2,833 
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 2 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.237 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IE      
Q1y md  11,316 2,632 699 2,773 14,469 
Q1y  5,730 1,336 932 1,265 8,317 
Q1md  5,434 1,657 531 1,668 8,185 
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 2 0.000 0.000 0.452 0.000 0.000 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 0.000 0.000 0.151 0.000 0.000 
NL      
Q1y md  8,618 8,556 10,030 1,928 1,958 
Q1y  3,369 3,262 5,296 1,644 2,363 
Q1md  2,193 2,181 3,414 1,732 1,536 
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 2 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.032 0.000 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
SE      
Q1y md  6,108 4,225 5,485 2,495 6,110 
Q1y  7,303 3,052 3,515 2,605 9,041 
Q1md  3,015 1,562 1,434 1,430 3,869 
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 2 0.002 0.000 0.021 0.613 0.000 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UK      
Q1y md  11,870 9,018 6,138 5,578 6,117 
Q1y  7,115 5,603 5,488 4,836 5,782 
Q1md  5,264 5,335 4,856 4,476 4,133 
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 2 0.000 0.000 0.186 0.005 0.366 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 
Notes:  
1 Only including households with children under age 18 
2 This is the P-value from the adjusted Wald test testing the equivalence of the mean coverage rate. The standard 
errors take survey design into account. The variables accounting for survey design have been programmemed using 
the coding developed by Tim Goedeme (2011). 
Source: EU-SILC (2007) 
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Table 4.6: Average income share of benefit by overlap groups (in both 1st quintiles (Q1y md), 
only in 1st income quintile (Q1y), only in 1st material deprivation quintile (Q1md))  
 All transfers Housing &  
Social exclusion 
Social exclusion Housing Family 1 
DE      
Q1y md  0.386 0.358 0.443 0.109 0.280 
Q1y  0.240 0.169 0.268 0.082 0.229 
Q1md  0.115 0.142 0.179 0.036 0.124 
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FR      
Q1y md  0.467 0.378 0.430 0.247 0.245 
Q1y  0.242 0.168 0.200 0.152 0.185 
Q1md  0.096 0.078 0.049 0.075 0.086 
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IE      
Q1y md  0.529 0.135 0.040 0.140 0.612 
Q1y  0.255 0.096 0.053 0.093 0.325 
Q1md  0.138 0.065 0.021 0.066 0.209 
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 2 0.000 0.000 0.498 0.000 0.000 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
NL      
Q1y md  0.621 0.626 0.737 0.138 0.103 
Q1y  0.157 0.157 0.193 0.118 0.105 
Q1md  0.095 0.105 0.095 0.103 0.046 
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.727 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SE      
Q1y md  0.357 0.294 0.381 0.174 0.281 
Q1y  0.286 0.216 0.201 0.197 0.310 
Q1md  0.091 0.070 0.053 0.068 0.112 
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.177 0.035 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
UK      
Q1y md  0.688 0.541 0.347 0.352 0.345 
Q1y  0.352 0.305 0.238 0.313 0.275 
Q1md  0.162 0.186 0.133 0.180 0.119 
P-value (Q1y md = Q1y) 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
P-value  (Q1y md = Q1md) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes:  
1 Only including households with children under age 18 
2 This is the P-value from the adjusted Wald test testing the equivalence of the mean coverage rate. The standard 
errors take survey design into account. The variables accounting for survey design have been programmemed using 
the coding developed by Tim Goedeme (2011). 
Source: EU-SILC (2007) 
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